Turkey undertook a major liberalization of trade policies in the 1980s. Import quotas have become virtually nonexistent, the Turkish lira has been made convertible, and tariffs have generally been lowered so that the average nominal tariff rate is less than 10 percent. Given these changes and remaining export subsidies, Turkey has, on average, removed the antiexport bias from its external incentive regime.
Turkey undertook a major liberalization of trade policies in the 1980s. Import quotas have become virtually nonexistent, the Turkish lira has been made convertible, and tariffs have generally been lowered so that the average nominal tariff rate is less than 10 percent. Given these changes and remaining export subsidies, Turkey has, on average, removed the antiexport bias from its external incentive regime.
The impact on Turkey of its import-substitution trade policies in the 1970s and of its trade liberalization in the early 1980s has been the subject of several earlier studies, notably Baysan (1984) ; Baysan and Blitzer (1988, 1991) ; Rodrik (1988b) ; and Grais, de Melo, and Urata (1986) . Although few analysts object to the reduction in import barriers and the real exchange rate depreciation as an aid to exporters, the effectiveness of more direct export incentives has been questioned by Milanovic (1986) , Rodrik (1988a) , and Arslan and van Wijnbergen (1990) . The welfare effects of either the direct or indirect incentives, however, have not been estimated.
Starting with the relatively liberal trade regime of Turkey in the late 1980s, we use a 40-sector computable general equilibrium model to consider several fur-' ir traide%bX4lization options that are now open to the Turkish government.
The first option is across-the-board liberalization. Under this option, Turkey would completely reduce or remove its trade distortions, that is, its import tariffs and export subsidies. The second option is to consider sectoral liberalizations of tariffs or export subsidies. In this connection, we evaluate the reduction of tariffs and export subsidies that Turkey implemented during the late 1980s. The final option is the principal trade policy change Turkey is planning to implement: harmonization of its tariff structure to the common external tariff of the European Community (EC). This option is part of Turkey's effort to continue to press its case for membership in the EC. The evaluation of removing trade barriers yields what is perhaps our most important finding: first-best rules of thumb that may be appropriate for highly distorted economies are not necessarily appropriate for economies that have liberalized as much as Turkey. (Other developing countries that achieved a relatively liberal trade regime in the 1980s include Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, and Poland.) In particular, piecemeal across-the-board tariff reductions in Turkey are not always beneficial from a welfare perspective and generally must be coordinated with export subsidy reductions to ensure welfare gains. The counterfactual assumption that the tariff level of Turkey is at the level of 1985 (about twice the 1989 level of our benchmark model) reintroduces an antiexport bias in the external incentive regime. In this case piecemeal tariff reduction to the 1989 tariff level is beneficial.
We show that, because there is no antiexport bias, the principal distortions remaining in the trade regime derive from the dispersion of external incentives. The primary source of this dispersion is the export subsidy structure. Neutrality of external incentives is therefore able to achieve a high proportion of the benefits of full external liberalization.
As Turkey turned away from import substitution in the early 1980s, it adopted strong export promotion measures. We estimate that Turkey's policy in the late 1980s of reducing direct export incentives yielded very substantial welfare benefits. We also show that the policy of applying export subsidies in individual sectors with high tariffs, as a way to encourage exports in a sector that may otherwise rely only on the highly protected domestic market, is particularly counterproductive. The reason is that at the multisector level the distortion that the export subsidy adds by encouraging too many resources into the protected sector dominates the reduction in the overall antiexport bias.
If Turkey harmonizes its tariff to the common external tariff of the EC, there will be only small welfare changes. Whether these changes result in gains or losses will depend on how "harmonization" is done, because the EC and Turkey have different interpretations of what such a harmonization would mean. The welfare changes will be losses if the interpretation of the EC is followed, or gains if the interpretation of Turkey is followed. Harmonization to EC tariffs will require Turkish tariffs to be lowered from already low levels in the presence of export subsidies almost as large as the existing average effective tariff rate.
Beyond small reductions in the tariffs, the export subsidies become the dominant distortion to the trade regime, and the economy becomes too export oriented. Harmonization to the EC tariff structure can be a welfare-enhancing policy, however, if accompanied by a policy of removing or reducing export subsidies.
We exploit the ability of a "simulation laboratory" to control for revenue effects by adopting an explicit "replacement tax,' that is, a tax that enables government revenue to remain constant. We allow the value added tax (VAT) or a lump-sum tax to serve as replacement taxes for any changes in revenue. Given the structure of our model for Turkey (the model has no untaxed goods) and the range of replacement taxes, we find that the VAT produces results extremely close to a lump-sum replacement tax. In other words, the VAT has a relatively small marginal excess burden in this model.
Section I outlines the model, including the procedures used to empirically estimate the model to the Turkish economy using 1985 input-output data and 1989 protection data. Section II reports the results of the policy simulations.
Finally, section III draws conclusions for policy. Appendix A presents the equations of the model, and appendix B subjects the conclusions to systematic sensitivity analysis.
I. A MODEL FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Our small open economy (SOE) model is designed for trade policy analysis with a large number of sectors. The model is a generic, static general equilibrium model of a single economy along the lines of de Melo and Tarr (1992: ch. 3 ). The equations of the model are in appendix A. A description of the data set, the elasticities used, and more general features of the model may be found in Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1992) .
The General Structure of the Model
Goods are produced using labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. In export sectors a composite output is produced that distinguishes between goods destined for domestic and for export markets. This tradeoff is characterized by a constant elasticity of transformation frontier. Production is characterized by constant returns to scale. Producers behave competitively, selecting output levels such that marginal cost equals the given market price. Although the model allows increasing or decreasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, these features are not utilized here.
Final demand by private households arises from nested constant elasticity of substitution utility functions. At the top level, different types of goods enter in a constant elasticity aggregate. All income elasticities are unity. At the next lower level, composite imported goods trade off with corresponding domestic products, and there are possibly different elasticities of substitution by commodity. Imports from different sources substitute for one another at a lower nest in utility to form a composite import good for each sector. To capture the effects of geographically discriminatory protection policies, we allow imports and exports to bear different tariffs or subsidies, depending on their source or destination. This feature allows us to study policies such as harmonization or accession to a free trade area, albeit without any terms of trade effects.
Given the level of aggregation in the model, the data contradict the homogeneous product model assumption because they reveal that there are imports, exports, and domestic production in most sectors. Although at a more disaggregated level we would like fewer sectors with both imports and exports in the same sector, our assumption of product differentiation between imports and domestic production (the "Armington" assumption) as well as between exports and domestic production will explain these data.
Government expenditures and investment demand are exogenous. Government expenditures are funded by net tax revenues. There are three components of government income in addition to import tariffs and export subsidies: VATS on factor inputs to production, ad valorem production subsidies or excise taxes on production output, and lump-sum taxes on domestic consumers. In a counterfactual scenario one or more of the tax instruments adjusts endogenously to balance government (net) tax revenues with expenditures. This equal-yield constraint is accommodated through an endogenous proportional adjustment of VAT rates or lump-sum transfers. Thus the welfare effects of changes in trade policy explicitly incorporate the appropriate marginal excess burden of raising government revenue from other sources. Walras's law is satisfied because private consumption equals the income from primary factors plus transfers to consumers by the government (from taxes and import and export quota rents), and public consumption is balanced with the value of public endowments and tax revenue net of transfers.
World market import and export prices are given, that is, import supplies and export demand are infinitely elastic. This implies that the model affects a simple closure with respect to foreign trade so that the economy experiences no endogenous changes in the terms of trade. The current account balances the value of exports and imports, taking into account exogenously specified capital inflows.
There is only one private household in the model. Dixit and Norman (1980: 78-80; 1986) have shown, however, that providing there are aggregate (real) income gains from trade liberalization and accepting some weak conditions (that hold in our model), it is possible to effect Pareto-efficient reforms for multiple households by taxing commodities. 1 The SOE model is generated with the GAMS software developed by Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus (1988) ; it is solved with the MPS/GE software developed by Rutherford (1989) .
1. Dixit and Norman (1986) show that if the government imposes commodity and factor taxes that --tore autarchy prices for all consumer goods and factors of production (and therefore leave all conlners rlo w orse off), but does so in a situation where firms face the undistorted prices, then the government will have positive revenues (more precisely, positive accumulation of commodities) in a free-trade equilibrium.
The Turkish SOE Model
We employed the 1985 Turkish input-output table distinguishing 64 production sectors. We aggregated the 64 sectors to 40 sectors by individually adding or aggregating each of the smallest 24 sectors into the sectors closest to them. The 24 sectors account for only 5.1 percent of the value added to the economy in 1985. Table 1 displays the names of the 40 sectors. Given that one of the trade policy options that we sought to evaluate was the neutrality of external incentives, we were anxious not to bias results by aggregating the model excessively. Aggregating further (at least according to the criteria of value added) would have biased the model toward showing smaller welfare costs from disperse incentives because benchmark export subsidies would be less disperse in the benchmark equilibrium solely as an artifact of the process of aggregation. An alternative to employing a disaggregated model, which would reduce aggregation bias, is to use an explicit decision-theoretic metric to select sectors to be aggregated, an approach advocated by Harrison and Manning (1987) . This approach aggregates sectors having similar levels of protection and export subsidies. Given that the current state of modeling technology does not constrain us to aggregate significantly, we elected not to do so.
The column headings in table 1 are the policy instruments in the Turkish model. Domestic distortions consist of the VAT and production subsidies. The VAT rates listed in table 1 vary a great deal across sectors. One reason is that there is some slight statutory difference in the rates. More important, however, is that the rates are derived from observed collections in 1985, the year the VAT was barely introduced. There were a great many administrative difficulties in collection procedures, yielding different observed collection rates. Foreign trade distortions consist of import tariffs and export subsidies. The revenue instruments are tariffs and the VAT. There are no import quotas or voluntary export restraints (VERS) in the Turkey model, reflecting their virtual absence from the economy in 1989, the benchmark year for the tax and trade policies.
Turkish export subsidies consist of indirect measures (such as duty drawback and the waiver of corporate income tax and VAT obligations) and direct budgetary transfers for exports of eligible products. Using benchmark import and export shares as weights, the average import tariff in the model is 8.1 percent and the average export subsidy is 7.4 percent. There is considerable dispersion in these rates across sectors, and this dispersion turns out to be important for our welfare evaluation of the distortionary effects of tariffs and subsidies.
The structure of the export subsidy rates across sectors is adapted from Milanovic (1986, table VII.4). As explained in Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1992) , we regard the rates in table 1 as appropriate because they are somewhat low if one accounts for indirect export subsidies available through the tax code without sectoral discrimination and high only if direct budgetary subsidies are considered. We also performed simulations with larger export subsidy rates that reflect the earlier years. Regarding tariff dispersion, nine sectors account for 79 percent of the total tariff revenue: electrical machinery, 7.3 percent; iron and steel, 4.2 percent; machinery (except electrical), 13.4 percent; motor vehicles and equipment, 14.1 percent; other chemical products, 20.7 percent; other nonmetallic mineral production, 5.2 percent; petroleum refineries, 6.1 percent; textiles, 4.5 percent; and tobacco, 3.5 percent.
Estimates of elasticities had to be assembled for primary factor substitution, import demand, import source, domestic demand, and the transformation of domestic supply into domestic and exported products. Virtually all of the elasticity values were selected from a literature search, as described in Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1992) . Elasticity estimates are subject to a margin of error. Our "remedy" for this problem, which is endemic to any large-scale model of this kind, was to undertake systematic sensitivity analyses of the major results with respect to plausible bounds on these elasticities. (Harrison and others 1993 and Harrison and Vinod 1992 review the major issues in undertaking such analyses.) Even if we were unable to specify a point estimate with any precision, our priors over the likely bounds that these elasticities could take were quite strong. To the extent that our major conclusions are robust to perturbations over these bounds, we do not see our uncertainty over the specific values of these elasticities as a weakness of the model. 2 We report the results of these sensitivity analyses, which involve 1,000 simulations for each counterfactual policy, in appendix B. They allow us to conclude that our main results are robust, at least with respect to plausible uncertainty over elasticities.
II. POLICY ANALYSIS
We present our results by examining the principal trade policy options currently facing Turkey: across-the-board liberalization, sectoral liberalization, and harmonization with the external tariff of the EC.
Across-the-Board Liberalization
Quantitative restraints have been virtually eliminated in Turkey, and tariffs have been lowered, but some export subsidies remain. Does it enhance welfare to continue to reduce tariffs across the board while leaving export subsidies in place? Conversely, as a second-best measure to reducing the tariff, would it be beneficial to increase export subsidies to offset the antiexport bias of the tariff? We first consider the theory and conventional policy advice on this question in the context of the arguments for export subsidies.
The classic argument for export subsidies rests on the theoretical foundation of the Lerner (1936) symmetry theorem, which states that a tax on imports is equivalent to a tax on exports. It follows that if a two-sector economy has an unremovable import tax in the import-competing sector, it can offset the result-2. Any effort that could generate better bounds on these point estimates would help to generate policy conclusions that carry greater credibility, even if those conclusions will still be probabilistic in nature.
ing antiexport bias-with an export subsidy to the exporting sector. 3 Based largely on this argument, Balassa (1989) argues that for most developing countries an antiexport bias will likely prevail, even after tariff reduction and devaluation, which call for export promotion measures. Krueger (1984: 528) has noted that many "export promotion" measures employed by policymakers in developing countries are nothing more than partial offsets to the overall bias in the regime toward import substitution. Large export subsidies, however, generally create problems and are thus typically not recommended. These problems may include budgetary problems for the government and various types of rent-seeking behavior, such as falsifying export documents, lobbying to seek higher subsidy rates, and exporting a product and then reimporting it to obtain the subsidy. Nogues (1990) , for example, has shown that in Argentina export subsidies lead to fraud, corruption, and rent seeking. He concludes that in Latin America the level of import protection has been so dominant that the provision of fully offsetting subsidies would introduce budgetary problems and rent-seeking behavior that would be counterproductive and clearly inferior to the first-best policy of reducing the import protection. Based on evidence such as this, Thomas, Nash, and associates (1991) have concluded that large export subsidies should not be recommended.
Export subsidies per se in the manufacturing sector are proscribed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT); those who argue for export subsidies suggest the use of export subsidies that are legal under the GATT. Thus Balassa (1989) has recommended that developing countries rebate, both to direct and to indirect exporters, the import duties and indirect taxes on exports and that they provide, as well, preferential export credit and export insurance in the absence of private insurance. These "duty drawback" schemes have the effect of automatically linking tariff and tax reform with export subsidy reform. Figure 1 displays the welfare effects of reducing tariffs and export subsidies across the board. Reductions of tariffs alone cause some welfare gains initially, but these deteriorate into a welfare loss for reductions greater than 40 percent. This welfare loss is attributable to the Lerner symmetry effect. The average tariff is only slightly above the average export subsidy, so there is only a slight antiexport bias in external incentives. When tariffs are progressively reduced in a piecemeal manner, external incentives eventually become biased toward exports.
Welfare effects of across-the-board reductions in tariffs and export subsidies.
The benefits of export subsidy reductions continue up to a 70 percent reduction and are much more substantial at about 1 percent of gross domestic product 
20 40 60 80 100 Percentage reduction in policy distortions (GDP) because there is significantly greater dispersion in benchmark export subsidies. In this model the Turkish economy would gain about 1 percent of GDP from providing neutral incentives to all export sectors but less than 0.2 percent from tariff uniformity. 4 The process of taking an across-the-board reduction in export subsidies has the simultaneous effect of also reducing the dispersion in export subsidies, and it is the reduction in dispersion that is driving the result of figure 1 for export subsidy reduction. Because of the offsetting effects of tariffs and export subsidies, reducing export subsidies and tariffs jointly leads to even greater welfare gains than just reducing export subsidies does. Similarly, because of the presence of domestic distortions, reductions in foreign distortions fail to generate welfare gains at the margin when they reach the 80 percent level. Only when all distortions are removed is the optimal policy to reduce export subsidies and tariffs jointly by 100 percent. This is the first-best policy. Removing all domestic as well as foreign distortions results in further, small enhancements of welfare. 4. Our model is ill-suited for analyzing the question of optimal commodity taxation. Because there is no labor-leisure choice in our model, and all goods are taxable, the optimal nondiscriminatory commodity tax is uniform (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) . Because import taxes do not tax the domestic variety of the good, however, there are 40 untaxed goods in our model when import taxes are employed; hence, there are optimal departures from uniform import taxation. Our results show that the existing pattern of import taxes in Turkey is inferior to a uniform pattern of import taxation.
Dispersion in the export subsidy regime. We performed further simulations, depicted in figure 2, to bolster our interpretation that the dispersion in the export subsidy regime is the principal cause of the gains from reducing export subsidies. We eliminated the dispersion in export subsidies and import tariffs before reducing the level of the policy. In this case the results are much more consistent with the practical rule of thumb derived from the Lerner symmetry theorem. The average benchmark tariff of 8.1 percent is slightly higher than the average export subsidy of 7.4 percent, indicating a slight import bias in this new benchmark with uniform tariffs and export subsidies. Reductions in export subsidies result in welfare losses even at the margin because the regime becomes biased further toward imports. There is a very slight welfare gain from reducing tariffs by as much as 30 percent, with the maximal gain occurring at around the 10 percent level, when import tariffs just offset export subsidies exactly. When tariffs are reduced by more than 30 percent, the welfare losses are much larger, paralleling the losses obtained from reducing export subsidies alone. The welfare effects of reducing the level of foreign distortions, given that tariffs and subsidies are both initially neutral, are small compared with a welfare gain of 1.2 percent from providing a neutral external incentive regime.
The reason that neutral external incentives yield welfare benefits almost as large as full liberalization is that Turkey starts from a trade regime that is not significantly biased toward import substitution or export promotion. Other Percentage reduction in policy distortions things being equal, the more the economy is protected and the greater the antiexport bias, the smaller the proportion of the welfare benefits of liberalization that neutral external incentives will achieve. We performed some additional experiments to verify this interpretation. We benchmarked our model to the tariff rates prevailing in 1985, which were reported in table 1. Averaging 17.6 percent, these rates were about double those applying in 1989, weighted by 1985 shares of imports. Although the average 1985 tariff rate is somewhat small compared with rates of nominal protection in many developing countries, it does introduce an antiexport bias into the Turkish external regime. A piecemeal reduction in the 1985 tariff rates to the level of 1989 results in an increase in Turkish welfare of 0.07 percent of GDP, and the benefits of uniformity (of all distortions) are reduced from 99.9 to 94.1 percent of the benefits of fully removing all external and domestic distortions. These results also show that the tariff reductions that Turkey undertook in the late 1980s enhanced welfare.
Foreign distortions
If the external incentive regime were biased toward import substitution (that is, if the economywide average level of import protection exceeded the average level of export promotion), as is common in developing economies, then piecemeal lowering of import protection would improve welfare. The important lesson is that when a country has liberalized imports as much as Turkey, while at the same time maintaining significant export subsidies, further import liberalization must be balanced with further reductions in export subsidies. 5 Similarly, these results support the view that some small export subsidies are efficient if a country starts from an import regime that is significantly protected.
To the extent that export or production subsidies in Turkey are effected by a "duty drawback" on customs duties on imports or VAT, interaction effects such as we have examined will be built into any liberalization of those subsidy schemes. In other words, anything that lowers tariffs would endogenously lower export subsidies, generating these beneficial interaction effects. This may well be an unplanned advantage of using such drawback schemes.
Counterfactual simulation from higher export subsidies. The strong export promotion measures adopted by Turkey in the early 1980s have been questioned as excessive. We counterfactually scaled up all export subsidies to levels estimated to prevail in earlier years in Turkey and simulated the effects of the Turkish policy of lowering export subsidies toward the level of 1989. Doing so tilts the external incentives toward export promotion but greatly increases the dispersion in the export subsidies. We estimated that the Turkish export subsidy reduction policy of the late 1980s yielded very substantial welfare benefits.
We performed simulations with three new export subsidy rates of 2.0, 2.62, and 3.4 times the export subsidies of our original benchmark equilibrium. These new rates corresponded to export subsidies of 14.8, 19.4, and 25.2 percent, which were reported as the export subsidy rates prevailing in Turkey in 1988, 5. Similar results for the Polish economy are discussed by Tarr (1990). 1985, and 1986, respectively. As a percentage of GDP, the welfare benefits of reducing the export subsidies to the level of our original benchmark equilibrium are 3.6, 6.5, and 12.1 percent, respectively, the higher welfare benefits corresponding to reduction of the higher export subsidies. The welfare benefits of reducing export subsidies increase more than proportionately to the scalar multiple of the export subsidy because the quantity of resources distorted increases with the price distortion of the subsidy and acts multiplicatively on the price distortion in calculating the welfare costs. These estimates are rather large compared with most estimates of the welfare benefits of trade liberalization in models with constant returns to scale. This finding runs contrary to the conventional wisdom that only models with increasing returns to scale will achieve large welfare benefits from trade liberalization and is due to the fact that without specific factors in our model the elasticity of supply in the sectors receiving export subsidies is very large. Thus, the export subsidy induces a large amount of resource movement. Interestingly, the welfare effects of subsidy reduction are only slightly affected by rebenchmarking with 1985 tariff rates, reflecting the fact that the dispersion of the export subsidy is of primary importance in these results.
Distributional effects across sectors. Finally, we assessed distributional effects of across-the-board liberalization by noting which sectors are the biggest winners and losers when all foreign and domestic distortions are removed. The six sectors with the largest increase in total value added (with the absolute increase in their percentage of total value added) are air transport, 1.4; other land transport, 0.23; ownership of dwellings, 0.11; personal and professional services, 0.25; restaurants and hotels, 0.23; and wholesale and retail trade, 1.25. From table 1, none of these sectors received either export subsidies or import tariffs. Moreover, the six sectors are primarily nontraded goods, and the incentives to the nontraded goods sectors will improve after the tariffs and export subsidies are removed.
The six sectors with the largest decrease in total value added (with their absolute decrease in their percentage of total value added) are agriculture, -0.83; fabricated metal products, -0.36; iron and steel, -0.45; other chemical products, -0.18; textiles, -0.40; and wearing apparel, -0.32. Except for agriculture, these sectors lose their substantial export subsidies, which explains the decline in their shares. In agriculture, the loss of the production subsidy induces the loss of the share in value added. Because nominal export subsidies are concentrated in manufacturing industries, there has been some debate over the claim that export subsidies in Turkey have an "antiagriculture" bias. We tested this claim by examining value added in agriculture before and after the export subsidies were removed. We defined "agriculture" broadly as consisting of nine sectors in our model: agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, forestry, manufacture of other food products, meat processing, sugar, tobacco, and vegetable and animal oils and fats. Defining agriculture as solely the sector "agricul-ture" in table 1 would not change the following conclusions. Value added in the broadly defined agricultural sector increases by 1.2 percent after all export subsidies were completely removed. Alternatively, if both export subsidies and import tariffs are completely removed, value added in agriculture declines by 0.7 percent. Krueger (1984, p. 528) has noted that in some developing countries firms have been required or induced to export in return for privileges accorded in the domestic market. Presumably the argument is that the sector is not motivated to export without the export subsidy or requirement because the sector receives a relatively high price on the domestic market as a result of the import protection.
Sectoral Liberalization
On the contrary, however, an export subsidy will not offset the effect of a high tariff. Rather it will exacerbate the problem of misallocating too many resources to the protected sector. We investigated the impact on the Turkish economy of removing or reducing tariffs or export subsidies, or both, from individual sectors. Given piecemeal policy change in a particular sector, the interaction with the VAT in the sector will become important. In particular, if a sector enjoys a high tariff and high export subsidy, excessive resource allocation to the sector will be reduced by a high VAT. Table 2 summarizes the welfare effects of piecemeal reform in individual sectors. The results show the consequences of removing existing export subsidies and import tariffs one sector at a time, leaving protection in all other sectors at benchmark levels. The column titled "tariff and export subsidy" simultaneously removes both tariffs and export subsidies in the sector. The first three columns represent total removal of the policy, whereas the last two columns, labeled "marginal reform,' report results for scenarios in which sectoral tariffs and export subsidies are reduced by 10 percent. To provide a consistent basis for comparison, we multiplied the welfare effect of these marginal 10 percent reductions by 10 to indicate the welfare consequences of complete reform that would be "predicted" by a marginal analysis. We do not report the "tariff and export subsidy" column for the marginal changes because the results are roughly additive in the two components that are displayed.
The first result on which we focus is the welfare effects of export subsidy and tariff reduction in those sectors for which both the export subsidies are greater than 15 percent and tariffs are above average. From table 1, there are six sectors in this group: electrical machinery, fabricated metal products, glass and glass products, motor vehicles and equipment, other chemical products, and rubber products. For a marginal reduction in export subsidies, there is a welfare gain in all sectors except motor vehicles. Similarly, for a marginal reduction in tariffs, there is a welfare gain in all sectors except electrical machinery. Motor vehicles experienced the highest VAT rate in the economy at 25.8 percent, which means that export subsidies offset the impact of too little resources in motor vehicles as GDP. a. Tariffs and export subsidies are initially reduced by 10 percent; the results are multiplied by 10 to indicate the welfare consequences of a complete reform that would be predicted by using a marginal analysis.
Source: Authors' estimations.
a result of the VAT. In electrical machinery, there is also an above-average VAT rate; moreover, the tariff rate, which is close to the average rate in the benchmark, is also offsetting the VAT at the margin. Because welfare increases from export subsidy reduction, these results support the view that using high export subsidies in sectors with above-average tariffs is counterproductive.
Theory suggests that the distortion costs of a tariff or subsidy increase more than proportionally with the size of the tariff or subsidy because the quantity of resources misallocated also increases and acts multiplicatively on the tariff or subsidy in calculating the value of the distortion costs. Thus the greater the export subsidy, the greater the benefits of export subsidy reduction at the margin. The concentration of high export subsidies in a few sectors in Turkey is likely to be a problem for this reason. Examining the three cases of export subsidies above 20 percent-electrical machinery, fabricated metal products, and iron and steel-there are indeed substantial benefits from reducing the export subsidy at the margin, even though for iron and steel the tariff rate is below average. The same general policy conclusion also holds for the seven sectors with tariffs greater than 30 percent.
In many sectors there are welfare losses from reductions in tariffs or export subsidies, or both, either in terms of marginal or complete liberalization. In addition, in several sectors marginal liberalization can be beneficial in welfare terms and yet complete liberalization can be harmful. 6 These results are explained by the fact that after some point further reduction of tariffs or export subsidies results in a bias in incentives against the sector, given that tariffs and export subsidies remain in place in the rest of the economy.
Harmonization with the EC
Turkey has long aspired to becoming a member of the EC. As part of the negotiations with the EC on this matter, Turkey has adopted a policy of harmonizing its tariff structure with the Common External Tariff (CET) of the EC. There has been some dispute, however, as to exactly what harmonization would mean.
Turkey's "effective (nominal) tariff" consists of a statutory customs duty and a series of import surcharges, such as stamp taxes and wharf charges. The customs duty varies across sectors, but the surcharges are generally uniform. We refer to the sum of the customs duty and the surcharges as the "total duty" to be applied to dutiable imports.
Turkey exempts a significant portion of imports from duties, however, through a number of mechanisms including duty drawbacks and the investment code. The result of these exemptions is that the share of imports that is dutiable varies greatly across sectors. Hence the effective (nominal) tariff is the product of the total duty and the share of imports that is dutiable in each sector. This effective duty is the best measure of the nominal protection in each sector.
These distinctions become crucial in attempting to implement a political commitment to "harmonize the tariff structure." Turkey initially interpreted harmonization to mean that it would levy a zero customs duty and reduced import 6. With respect to export subsidies, examples (in table 2) include machinery (except electrical), meat processing, textiles, and vegetable and animal oils and fats. With respect to tariffs, examples include machinery (except electrical), motor vehicles and equipment, other nonmetallic mineral production, textiles, and motor vehicles and equipment. surcharges on imports from the EC. According to this interpretation of harmonization, the customs duty on non-EC imports would be set equal to the CET of the EC, and all import surcharges on non-EC imports would remain unchanged. The net effect of this interpretation, as far as the EC was concerned, was that the EC would face positive tariffs on exports to Turkey. Instead, the EC may have expected "harmonization" to mean that goods from the EC would be imported duty-free into Turkey.
After negotiation with the EC, Turkey has considered revising the harmonization policy to accord better with the initial expectations of the EC. According to. this view all surcharges would be incorporated into the customs duty, and only this single total tariff would apply to imports. The total tariff on EC imports would be zero and would be equal to the CET on non-EC imports.
Assuming the continued use in Turkey of exemptions from import duties, the effective (nominal) tariff on non-EC imports would be lower than the CET that the EC itself applies on those imports. That is, after harmonization Turkey would be applying lower average tariffs than the EC does.
Given the political importance of harmonization with the EC, we considered the effects of each interpretation. With either interpretation of the CET and with VAT as the replacement tax, the change in welfare from CET harmonization is small. Under Turkey's interpretation of the CET, Turkey's welfare would increase by 0.007 percent of GDP. Under the EC's interpretation of the CET, Turkey's welfare would be reduced by 0.024 percent of GDP.
CET harmonization reduces Turkey's average tariff. For small reductions in the tariff, such as those implied by the Turkish version of harmonization, there is a slight gain in welfare. As explained above, further uncoordinated reductions in the tariff level from the already low level eventually result in welfare losses. Thus, although the difference is slight, the EC version of harmonization results in a loss simply because the tariff reduction is larger.
Alternatively, by combining CET harmonization with removal of export subsidies Turkey can expect to obtain significant welfare gains from EC tariff harmonization. This result follows from our analysis of the joint effects of removing tariffs and export subsidies in figure 2, along with our interpretation of CET harmonization as a de facto across-the-board reduction in tariffs. Irrespective of the final policy package, the main policy lesson here is that the welfare effects of quibbling over the proper interpretation of CET harmonization are in the second order of smalls.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The principal trade liberalization exercise currently being considered by Turkey is harmonization to the common external tariff of the EC. We find that harmonization would have little beneficial effect on welfare compared with several other options. It is important to accompany a harmonization policy with export subsidy reduction to achieve significant benefits.
The most important policy conclusion from our analysis concerns the fragility of first-best rules of thumb as to the welfare benefits of piecemeal trade policy reforms for countries that have reduced trade barriers as much as Turkey has but that have retained export subsidies. The results of trade policy reforms then depend crucially on both the level and the dispersion of import tariffs and especially of export subsidies. In other words, it is not the case that any partial movement toward the first-best trade policy for Turkey will result in some fraction of the welfare gains from that first-best package. Of course this is a restatement of well-known second-best results. What is new, however, is an attempt to assess the quantitative significance of these effects for Turkey. In doing so we are able to gain some insights into which particular distortions have more or less severe second-best effects.
APPENDIX A. AN ALGEBRAIC FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear equations corresponding to the three classes of equilibrium conditions associated with an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium: price-cost relations for producers, supply-demand balance for commodity and factor markets (including balance of payments), and income-expenditure balance for domestic consumers and government. The model is generated using the GAMS programming language. It is solved using the software of Rutherford (1989) , which employs the modified Newton (SLCP) algorithm created by Mathiesen (1985) . A central set of variables (prices, activity levels, and income levels) characterizes the economic equilibrium. All important notation is summarized in table A-1.
Technology, Preferences, and Market Clearance Conditions
Domestic production is an aggregate of domestic and exported varieties of goods with a constant elasticity of transformation:
This relation can be interpreted as implying differences in the technical processes associated with production for domestic and export markets. The elasticity of transformation defined by E 2 will be lower for goods that are highly differentiated and higher for goods that are relatively homogeneous. The specification of this elasticity may be influenced by the intended time frame of the analysis. In the short run it is more difficult to transform plants between domestic and export-oriented products.
Imports from different trading partners trade off with domestic varieties in intermediate demand, investment demand, and final demand. For simplicity (and because of data limitations) we assume that the import composition and import-domestic substitution possibilities in investment, intermediate, and final demand are identical. Under these conditions we can represent inputs as though they were composed of a single import-domestic aggregate for each commodity. The aggregation of domestic and imported varieties is characterized by a nested constant-elasticity function of domestic and imported goods: Gi-l) where Mi represents a composite import from two or more regions, r: The prices that appear in this equation are exogenous parameters, the international prices of imports and exports. This constraint has an associated variable, which is the "real exchange rate." The model, however, contains no monetary instruments and determines only relative prices.
Factor markets always clear with flexible prices:
Income-Expenditure Balance
Consumer income includes primary factor earnings plus foreign capital inflows less transfers. Final demand is modeled by budget-constrained utility maximization by a representative agent. The budget constraint is:
In this equation Wk represents the market price of primary factor k, B represents the foreign exchange balance, and TTT represents the level of lump-sum transfer. Unlike private households, government demands are held constant in all simulations. The government budget constraint is accommodated through endogenous scaling of one of the three government tax instruments so that revenue balances with expenditure. Government income consists of five components: (1) lump-sum transfers from households, T; plus (2) import tariffs, tij; plus (3) VATS on factor inputs to production, vi; less (4) production subsidies, si,; less (5) export subsidies, sX. The government budget is (A-9) EXi Gi = rT T + TrtEpmtir miT
In the government budget equation, parameters that endogenously adjust to balance income and expenditure are rT for lump-sum transfers, r, for tariffs, and T, for VATS. In any given equilibrium only one of these parameters departs from the default value of unity.
Price-Cost Balance
Producers price at marginal cost. In production the marginal cost of supply for sector i (ci) is defined by
With constant-returns-to-scale technology and no barriers to entry, excess profits go to zero. Producers then equate marginal cost with market price gross of subsidy, providing the following zero-profit condition: (A-1) (1 + sfP(piDi + pxXi) + p7xXisx= ci Yi.
In this equation the first term represents the value of output gross of production subsidy, and the second term captures the effect of the export subsidy.
The import aggregation always equates price with marginal cost. This means that the value of domestic supply equals the cost of domestic inputs plus imports gross of tariffs and rents: (A-12) 7r i= pi Di + Z( as we examine alternative market structure assumptions or move from a static framework to a growth setting. We plan to examine these extensions using the soE model, but we do not believe that they can be treated briefly enough to be included here. The sensitivity analysis uses the procedures developed by Harrison and 'Vinod (1992) . Essentially these procedures amount to a Monte Carlo simulation exercise, in which a wide range of elasticities are independently and simultaneously perturbed from their benchmark values. These perturbations follow prescribed distributions, such as a t-distribution with a specified standard deviation and degrees of freedom, or a uniform distribution over a specified range. The exact distributional assumptions used are documented in Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1992) . The mpss software used to implement the Monte Carlo simulations is documented in Harrison (1990) .
For each Monte Carlo run, we solve the counterfactual policy with the selected set of elasticities. This process is repeated until we arrive at the desired sample size, in our case 1,000. The results are then tabulated as a distribution, with equal weight being given (by construction) to each Monte Carlo run. The upshot is a probability distribution defined over the endogenous variables of interest. In our case we focus solely on the welfare effects of each policy.
The. policies that we examine and the results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in table B-i. The "sample size" column refers to the number of Monte Carlo runs that were actually completed. In each case we have at least 1,000 runs, which should be enough to obtain a reliable picture of the distribution of results. The "point estimate" column shows the welfare effect of the policy when all elasticities are set equal to their benchmark, or point estimate (PE), values. These are the results reported and discussed in the results section of the text. The point estimate is the change in welfare caused by the policy as a percentage of GDP. b. Probability that the welfare increased under the counterfactual policy. c. Probability that the welfare effect under the counterfactual policy, using perturbed elasticities, is greater than or equal to the welfare effect obtained under the counterfactual policy point estimate.
The remaining columns report the results of the sensitivity analysis proper. The mean, median, and standard deviation are given to provide simple indicators of the location and dispersion of the distribution of welfare results. The skewness and kurtosis statistics that are necessary to gain a more complete impression of the distribution are not reported in the table. In all cases we find that there is indeed significant skewness in the distribution, but insignificant kurtosis. The skewness in these distributions manifests itself in a systematic difference between the mean and median reported. Thus comparison of these two statistics indicates the direction of the skewness. Why do we get such significant skewness in the distributions? There are two general reasons why this might occur: induced skewness as a result of our explicit distributional assumptions, and intrinsic skewness in the (implicit) function linking the set of elasticities and welfare. Each can be evaluated.
The explicit assumptions made in our sensitivity analysis result in a large number of skewed distributions for production activities that have benchmark Leontief technologies. The activities that fall into this category combine intermediate inputs and value added. In this case we allow perturbations of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.0, as well as the benchmark value of zero. To see if this is the source of the skewness, we can remove these perturbations for these activities and rerun the sensitivity analysis to see if the skewness disappears. We have done this for the uniformity policy simulation (making all export subsidies uniform) and find that it does not account for the skewness. The other possible reason for skewed results is more subtle than the presence of skewed distributional assumptions but could well be more important. It has to do with the "asymmetry" of the implicit function that takes a given set of elasticities and generates the welfare effect. It is perfectly possible that equi-sized perturbations of a given elasticity can have different absolute effects on welfare. 7 We can evaluate this source of skewness with respect to blocks of elasticities of the same type by setting those elasticities equal to their PE value. We do this for the simulation of uniformity of policy and with respect to each elasticity block. No single block can account for the skewness. We conclude that there is no single block of elasticities that is causing this skewness.
The "probability" columns indicate the qualitative policy results. The "welfare increased" column shows the probability from the empirical distribution that welfare increased in the counterfactual policy. This gives a measure of the confidence that we have the sign right when we look at the point estimate welfare effect, the mean, or the median. Similarly, the next column shows the probability that a welfare effect greater than or equal to the PE welfare effect was obtained. If the PE result perfectly represents the location of the distribution of results, this value should be around one-half; this would be the case if the PE result exactly equaled the reported median result. A value lower (higher) than one-half indicates that the distribution generally lies below (above) the PE result.
Finally, to gain a better sense of the confidence to be attached to the PE or mean result, we report lower and upper bounds from 50 and 75 percent symmetric confidence intervals around the median result. These confidence intervals show the smallest and largest values that lie within 50 or 75 percent of the distribution centered on the median. Thus a 50 percent confidence interval between 1.1 and 2.3 can be interpreted to mean that 50 percent of the Monte Carlo runs produced welfare results between these values.
Six observations can be made from these sensitivity analyses regarding our policy conclusions.
7. For example, our sensitivity analysis allows equal increases and decreases in the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced and imported goods in our Armington aggregate. However, it is plausible that increasing this elasticity from 2 to 3 has very little impact on welfare, whereas reducing it from 2 to I has a large impact. The source of our priors on this is no more than visual and casual inspection of isoquants with the relevant elasticities of substitution: once the elasticity gets above 2 it stays pretty flat, but dropping it down to 1 adds significant curvature.
First, the welfare gains from the first-best liberalization policy are robust to uncertainty over elasticities. The median and PE estimates are of the same order of magnitude-around 1.3 percent.
Second, the welfare gains from reform of export subsidies are not as large as they were with the PE elasticities. This applies to the policy of uniformity as well as to the policy of liberalization. In each case the welfare gains drop to around 0.87 percent, rather than to the initial results of 1.0 percent or so when PE elasticities are used. It is noteworthy, however, that just reducing export subsidies by 20 percent continues to generate a relatively large fraction of the welfare gains from the complete liberalization of export subsidies. Given the decline in welfare gains as a result of the uniformity and liberalization policies, this fraction is even larger than before. The higher fraction confirms the policy conclusion that it is important to have the highest export subsidies reduced, at the very least.
Third, there continues to be a welfare loss from unilateral liberalization of tariffs. This loss increases from 0.1 percent of GDP to around 0.2 percent when we allow for uncertainty over elasticities.
Fourth, the welfare gains from moving toward uniformity of foreign distortions or of all distortions appear to be very robust.
Fifth, the welfare losses obtained when tariffs or export subsidies are liberalized from a benchmark in which all foreign distortions are uniform are qualitatively robust. The welfare loss for tariff liberalization is somewhat larger than before, strengthening our earlier policy conclusion in this respect.
Finally, the welfare effects of removing the VAT with a lump-sum replacement are even "more neutral" then before. Rather than a welfare loss of 0.342 percent, we now find a median welfare loss of only 0.09 percent, with a standard deviation of approximately the same value. This confirms the earlier finding that the existing VAT serves well as a practical alternative to the lump-sum tax as a distortion-free replacement tax.
